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EDUCATION RIGHTS AND THE NEW DUE PROCESS
ARETO A. IMOUKHUEDE
INTRODUCTION
This Article argues for a human dignity-based, due process clause analysis to recognize
the fundamental duty of government to provide high quality, public education. Access to public
education is a fundamental duty, or positive fundamental right because education is a basic
human need and a constituent part of all democratic rights.
In The Fifth Freedom, I argued that there is a fundamental duty under the U.S.
Constitution to provide public education and that the reason a fundamental right to public
education has not been recognized is because of a profound confusion regarding fundamental



Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University; J.D., 2002, Georgetown University

Law Center; B.A., 1999, Northwestern University. I offer a special thanks to Charlton Copeland,
David A. Lacy, and Terry Smith, for their helpful comments and suggestions right from the
earliest stages of this project. I thank all the scholars who participated in the 2012 John Mercer
Langston Scholarship Workshop for exceptional feedback on an early draft of this Article. I
thank Lean Alcantara, Melissa Aponte Martini, and Harold A. Pryor for their excellent research
assistance. I thank the Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center for supporting
my work on this article with a generous writing grant. Finally, I thank Bridget, Emmanuel, and
Princess Imoukhuede for their unfailing support.

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT
EDUCATION RIGHTS AND THE NEW DUE PROCESS, 47 Ind. L. Rev. __ (Forthcoming 2014).

rights as duties.1 The Court is biased towards protecting negative rights or liberties over
enforcing positive rights or duties.2 As a result, the Court has failed to develop a framework for
protecting even the most basic and widely accepted of fundamental duties, the constitutional duty
to provide high quality, public education.3
Here, I demonstrate that education is essential to any meaningful concept of personal
liberty and to democracy. Without an educated citizenry, liberty and democracy are merely
empty concepts devoid of meaning for all but the economically privileged and socially
advantaged. For instance, voter turnout is much lower amongst people with no college
educations as compared to people with college and graduate level degrees.4 The voter turnout

1. Id. at 87.
2. See id. at 81; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
3. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“Education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated
as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not justify by
compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its
population.”).
4. See, e.g., Aina Gallego, Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in
Comparative Perspective, 29 ELECTORAL STUD. 239, 240 (2010) (discussing findings that welleducated citizens vote more frequently than the poorly educated in some countries, including the

for adults who have not completed high school is even lower.5 Hence, it is well understood that
education inspires and enables meaningful democratic engagement.6
Recognizing that public education is a basic capability that is essential to human dignity
requires application of a due process clause analysis similar to that applied in the recent human
dignity-based holding of Lawrence v. Texas.7 Ironically, Lawrence, which is a negative-rights

United States); Barry C. Burden, The Dynamic Effects of Education on Voter Turnout, 28
ELECTORAL STUD. 540 (2009) (analyzing survey data from 1952 to 2004, showing that the effect
of college education increased starting in 1980s, thereby magnifying the ability of educational
attainment to predict turnout).
5. Rachel Milstein Sondheimer & Donald P. Green, Using Experiments to Estimate the
Effects of Education on Voter Turnout, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 174-179 (2009) (arguing that there is
a powerful relationship between education and voter turnout and pointing out that political
participation is the function of one’s level of education; people with mere high school education
or less are less likely to vote).
6. See Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L.
REV. 261, 262 (2005) (arguing that autonomy as a constitutional value was always implied in
many fundamental rights, but neglected in voting specially when the political autonomy to vote
of the minorities and that minority voters must experience for themselves the value of
autonomy).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding that the Texas statute which made it a crime for people
of the same sex to engage in sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to males who
engaged in these same sex sexual activities in the privacy of their own homes).
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and liberty-based holding, can serve as the template for recognizing the positive right of access
to public education.8 While the basic right recognized in Lawrence is the right to privacy, free of
government intrusion, Lawrence rests on a broader notion of substantive due process: that
privacy is essential to liberty and human dignity.9 Like the right to privacy, education is also
essential to liberty. However, the case for a dignity-based due process clause protection of the
right to public education is even stronger for education than the case for the right to privacy.
This is because education is essential to both the liberty and the democracy components of
human dignity.10
This Article begins in Part I by discussing the nature of the U.S. “national education
crisis”11 and reasons that improving public education across the U.S would help advance
innovation and the nation’s long term gross domestic product. I then discuss empirical research
that demonstrates that educational inequality based on race, ethnicity, and wealth has only
become worse.12 Race and socioeconomic educational inequality comparisons between the U.S.
and Canada demonstrate that the way things are with regard to U.S. educational inequity is not

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Smith, supra note 7, at 301-302 (arguing that autonomy as a constitutional value
was always implied in many fundamental rights, but neglected in voting especially when the
political autonomy to vote of the minorities and that minority voters must experience for
themselves the value of autonomy).
Insert infra note to third footnote in Part I where I references “a national education
crisis.”
12
Insert infra note to my citation in Part I to Darling Hammond’s “Soaring Systems” article.
1111

the way things have to be or have to remain. The section closes with the Deweyan insight that in
addition to affecting economic prosperity, education also impacts the capability of citizens to
fully and meaningfully engage in the political process.13
Part II demonstrates that equal and fair access to high quality education is essential to
democracy and human dignity. This Part argues with the support of classical, enlightenment,
and modern philosophers such as Aristotle,14 Jacques Rousseau,15 and John Dewey,16 that a welleducated citizenry is essential to democracy. This Part connects concepts of liberty with the
capabilities approach as applied by Amartya Sen17 and Martha Nussbaum.18 This approach

Insert infra note to the footnote in Part I referencing Dewey’s DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION. Please change the reference to EDUCATION IN THE US into a “see also” and
add to the see also list MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (Harvard Univ. Press 2011)
and AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2011).
13

14. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 229 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984)
(“Since there is a single end for the city as a whole, it is evident that education must necessarily
be one and the same for all . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY: A READER 100 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds.,
2000) See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, 11-15
(G.D.H. Cole trans., 1968) ((Rousseau explains that “through the social contract we gain civil
liberty and moral liberty: the former involves being ruled by a general will instead of our
individual self-interest. The latter means obedience to rules which we, in association with our
fellow citizens, have made.”)
16. See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 4 (Free Press 1966) (1916).
17. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 4-5, 10-11, 36-49, 144 (1999).
18. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
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supports protecting basic capabilities that enhance freedom; including the capability to be
educated.19 The capabilities approach treats education as important to economic and political
participation.20 Based on this capabilities based analysis, Part II concludes that being educated is
essential to liberty, democracy, and human dignity.21
Part III explains how modern Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has retreated from
its early equality aspirations as it has continued to embrace an increasingly libertarian
perspective.22 This Part begins by discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s early proclamations

APPROACH 32-33 (Belknap Press 2011). Among Nussbaum’s brief list of ten centrally important
capabilities is the capability for “Senses, Imagination, and Thought.” Id. at 33. Nussbaum
explains that the capability to think and reason in a “truly human” way requires an adequate
education. Id.
19. See, e.g., id.
20. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231-35, 275-76, 283, 291-96, 300, 304
(Belknap Press 2011). Sen first discusses the link between economic wealth and substantive
freedoms; for example, while there is a link between higher income and “freedom from
premature mortality,” other factors come into play including public healthcare, access to medical
care, access to education, and social unity.
21

Id. at 226-27.

22. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 28, 55–57, 83 (2004). See also Jamie B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Radical
Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521, 525–29 (1995) (arguing that the political gains made by African

regarding the importance of education and how the Warren Court overcame problematic liberal
theories of equality that had previously been used to justify “separate but equal” in education and
other contexts.23 Part III concludes by recognizing that the modern Court has abandoned
equality as a viable principle of justice, in favor of a liberty-centered jurisprudence that ignores
the equality principle.24
Part IV prescribes an alternative approach for recognizing and protecting a right to public
education based in a due process clause analysis. Such an approach would allow education
rights advocates to overcome the Equal Protection Clause limitations described in Part III.25

Americans and other minorities during the Civil Rights era and under the Warren Court have
been reduced by the current conservative Court); Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase,
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1201–02 (2000) (arguing that the Court has made it clear that equality is
not a factor to observing Eighth Amendment challenges).
23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence Of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169
(2011). Henry explores and expands the concept of dignity in the U.S. Constitutional Law
context and makes three important findings. First, the Court’s reliance on dignity is increasing,
and the Roberts Court is accelerating that trend. Second, in contrast to its past use, dignity is
now as likely to be invoked by the more conservative Justices on the Court as by their more
liberal counterparts. Finally, the study demonstrates that dignity is not one concept, as other
scholars have theorized, but rather five related concepts.
25. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
Kenji Yoshino connects liberty and equality through a concept of human dignity and suggests
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Part IV critiques Kenji Yoshino’s “pluralism anxiety” and argues for applying the more accurate
label of “xenophobia” to describe the societal pressures animating the Court’s abandonment of
equality. Despite this critique of Yoshino’s pluralism anxiety label, this part embraces
Yoshino’s central argument that a due process clause-based human dignity approach to
recognizing constitutional duties is more likely to achieve success, because the Court appears to
have already applied human dignity as a proxy for other rights, most recently when examining
privacy rights in Lawrence v. Texas.26
I. THE NATURE OF THE EDUCATION PROBLEM
Ensuring that every child in the U.S. at least receives a high quality primary and
secondary school education is obviously important in our increasingly complex, global society.27
[A]ccess to an equitable, empowering education for all people has become a
critical issue for the American nation as a whole. No society can thrive in a
technological, knowledge-based economy by depriving large segments of its
population of learning. But at a time when three-quarters of the fastest-growing
occupations require post-secondary education, just over one-third of our young
people receive a college degree. Meanwhile, in many European and Asian nations,

that a liberty-centered human dignity approach that derives respect and equal dignity for all is
more likely to achieve litigation success than an equality based approach.
26. Id. at 776-796 (using Lawrence v. Texas as an example of the liberty-based dignity
claim).
27. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Soaring Systems: High Flyers All Have Equitable
Funding, Shared Curriculum, and Quality Teaching, AM. EDUCATOR, Winter 2010-2011,
http://www.aft.org/pdfs/americaneducator/winter1011/DarlingHammond.pdf.

more than half of young people are becoming college graduates.28
Despite this need for what Darling-Hammond frames as an “equitable and empowering
education,” the U.S. is in the midst of what some, including myself, have characterized as “a
national education crisis.”29 Fear of lagging economic growth lies at the heart of many current
political and economic debates both in the U.S. and across the world.30 Economists recognize
high quality education can aid in enhancing innovation, thereby advancing a nation’s long term

28. Id. at 19.
29. Regina Ramsey James, How to Mend a Broken Act: Recapturing Those Left Behind
By No Child Left Behind, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 683, 694–97 (2010) (“Millions of children in our
nation’s public education system are still not receiving the fair, equal, and significant opportunity
for a high-quality education”); Dennis J. Condron & Vincent J. Roscigno, Disparities Within:
Unequal Spending and Achievement in an Urban School District, 76 SOC. OF EDUC. 1, 20 (2003)
(“[R]acial and class inequality in school funding illustrate[s] these realities in the contemporary
era, showing how being of a minority or poor social-class is often synonymous with attending a
school that is dilapidated, overcrowded, unsafe, and unhealthy”); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at
49-50.
30. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/ (summarizing the
chronology of the current economic crisis, from housing bubble to credit crunch and financial
crisis) (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). See also James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global
Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. OF
ECON.. 563 (2012) (arguing that the current financial crisis is the result of deregulation, financial
innovation, a variety of booms and bust, and the structural flaws of the financial system).
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gross domestic product.31 Thus, improving public education across the U.S. can be a real factor
in advancing our nation’s long term gross domestic product.32 The simple recognition that high
quality public education positively effects long term economic growth should by itself be more
than sufficient reason for our nation to take seriously the current national education crisis in
order to ensure our nation’s prosperity for posterity.33

31. See Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 74 (citing Philip Stevens & Martin Weale,
Education and Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION 164, 164-167 (Geraint Johnes ed., 2004) (construing a formula regarding economic
prosperity and quality of education in democratic society))
Ln GDP per Capita = 0.35 in enrollment rate + 5.23
“According to Stevens and Weale’s theory, increased investments in education ultimately
increase innovation, which in the long term increases a nation’s GDP.”
32. Id.
33. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2007). Rebell argues:
Through state standards-based education reform initiatives and the Federal
No Child Left Behind Act, the United States has made an unprecedented and
extraordinary commitment to ensuring that all children will meet challenging
academic proficiency standards. To date, however, little progress has been made
toward meeting this ambitious mandate, largely because state and federal
educational policies fail to deal with the enormous impediments to learning that
are posed by the conditions of poverty in which millions of school children live.
Id. at 1467. See also Sarah L. Browning, Will Residency Be Relevant to Public Education in the
Twenty-First Century?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 297, 339 (2010) (“In order for present-day students to

Irrespective of the overall or average adequacy of the U.S. education system, one point
that is not in serious debate is the woeful race and wealth-based inequities in public education.34
Sadly, Julius Chambers’ statement regarding race, poverty and education is as true today as it
was back in 1987:
In America. . . the quality and quantity of education that children receive
remain tied to the race and economic status of their family. Many black and poor
children, through no fault of their own, continue to be deprived of training in even
the most basic skills, such as reading, writing and arithmetic. This deprivation
works a profound and lifelong injury to these neglected youths, and cripples their
ability to participate in political and economic life.
....
The United States is often romantically portrayed as a meritocracy. Yet,
the continuing poverty of a disproportionate number of black children, their
increasing isolation in largely segregated school systems, and the resistance of
white citizens both to full integration and to adequate funding of all school
districts, have perpetuated a system in which the potential achievement of a child
is highly correlated with the race and economic status of his parents.35

compete in this rapidly growing technological environment, our public education system may
require a reconfiguration of both the curriculum and the delivery system to prepare our students
for a promising future in the Information Age. This will require new thinking about the entire
public policy dimension of public education at the national and state levels.”).
34. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Restoring Our Schools: The Quest for Equity in the
United States, 51 EDUC. CANADA, no. 5, 2011, at 14. See also Julius Chambers, Adequate
Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 55-58 (1987)
(arguing that racial and economic inequality lead to inequality in opportunity to adequate
education and to make matters worse, racial and economic inequality are tied, thus minorities are
prone to inadequate education.); Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19.
35. Chambers, supra note 31, at 55-56.
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More recently, education scholar, Linda Darling-Hammond’s research demonstrates that
if anything, the racial inequities in education have only worsened.36
In 2011, the four-year high school graduation rate remains stagnant at
about 70 percent; the achievement gap between minority and White students in
reading and math is larger than it was in 1988; and U.S. performance on
international tests has continued to drop…
....
. . . In the U.S., the impact of socio-economic factors on student
performance is almost double what it is in Canada. . . . . In the U.S., White and
Asian students score just above the average for the European OECD nations in
each subject area, but African-American and Hispanic students – many of whom
are in highly segregated schools that lack qualified teachers and up-to-date
materials – score so much lower that the national average plummets to the bottom
tier. Thus, the poor U.S. standing is substantially a product of unequal access to
the kind of intellectually challenging learning measured on these international
assessments.37
Darling-Hammond’s research demonstrates that many empirical studies regarding the overall or
average quality of American education frequently overlook the abysmal quality of education the
U.S. education system affords most racial and ethnic minorities and impoverished children.38
Darling-Hammond’s socioeconomic and racial comparisons between the U.S. educational
system and Canada’s, indicates that the way things are in the U.S. is not the way things have to
be or have to remain. However, the notion of a U.S. education system is itself a bit of a
misnomer. Under current Constitutional law doctrine, the federal government can only play a
limited role in public education and therefore, the individual states are primarily involved in

36. Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19.
37. Id.
38. Id.

creating and ensuring the quality of their own state and local public education systems. 39 The
federal government’s role in public education is limited largely to its constitutional power to tax
and spend for the general welfare under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.40
However if this power were coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
based duty of government to protect equal access to publicly provided services, ought to provide
sufficient legal protection of the right of poor and minority children to receive at least the same
quality of public education as their more privileged peers. However, as to the issues of economic
privilege, current constitutional law doctrine fails to recognize wealth as a category of

39. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-742 (1974) (discussing that “no single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
schools). See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973) (stating
that “the Texas system . . . should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature
of the State’s efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the Constitution . . . [l]ocal
control is not only vital to continued public support of the school, but it is of overriding
importance from an educational standpoint as well.”); Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 122930 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing how education has, and should always remain in, local control).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.”).
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discrimination that would invoke meaningful constitutional law protection.41 As to race and
ethnicity, the U.S. Supreme Court, has largely retreated from its earlier mid-twentieth century
integrationist and equality aspirations for protecting equal access to public education.42
The quality of education affects more than economic prosperity, it also impacts the
capability of citizens to fully and meaningfully engage in the political process.43 This

41. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS:
ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 14 (2003); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 85; Brenna Bridget
Mahoney, Children at Risk: The Inequality of Urban Education, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
161, 169 (1991).
42. Eric P. Christofferson, Note, Rodriguez Reexamined: The Misnomer of “Local
Control” and a Constitutional Case for Equitable Public School Funding, 90 GEO. L.J. 2553,
2553-55 (2002) (“[d]isparities in the quality of education from one school district to the next are
both real and considerable.”); Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19 (discussing the quality of
education in predominantly poor and minority communities; the inequity of results and the
inequity of quality of teachers); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 49; Mahoney, supra note 38, at
162.
43. Thomas Jefferson, Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779), in
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 739-40 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974)
[hereinafter EDUCATION IN THE U.S]; DEWEY, supra note 14, at 4.
Editors, please change the reference to EDUCATION IN THE US into a “see also” and
add to the see also list MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (Harvard Univ. Press 2011)

connection between democracy and education has been recognized since the founding and has
continued to be recognized since that time.
Thomas Jefferson and his fellow founding fathers wrote official
declarations and papers that espoused a civic philosophy that public education is
essential to a democracy. They espoused normative arguments favoring public
education that have continued to be articulated by more contemporary educational
philosophers like John Dewey.44
In American democracy, “we the people” are not ruled, but rather we actively participate in
deciding who will be elected to serve us by electing individuals who we believe will further our
interests.
Absent the capability of citizens to comprehend the issues and thereby make informed
choices as to how best to further the public good, American democracy may begin to lose its
democratic character.45 Our republic will begin to look more like an aristocracy run exclusively
by those with sufficient wealth or other privilege to attain a largely unattainable quality of
education. Those few will effectively rule over a populace of largely uneducated people,
incapable of meaningfully evaluating the performance of those they have technically “elected,”

and AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2011).
44. Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 60. See also Jefferson, EDUCATION IN THE U.S., supra
note 40, at 739-40; DEWEY, supra note 14, at 4.
45. See DEWEY, supra note 14, at 8, (NU Vision Publication 2009) (1916); Imoukhuede,
supra note 1, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, at 63 (“Formal education has become
increasingly important as the scope of resources, achievements, and responsibilities in society
has grown more complex. No longer can children get by with a mere three years of formal basic
education and from there go on to apprentice themselves to adults.”).
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but who have actually been selected through a process that few understand.46 Such a failure of
education would diminish our grand republic into a form of aristocratic demagoguery that would
be less institutionally accountable or limited than a straightforward aristocracy.47 The highly
regarded education philosopher, John Dewey, believed:
[T]he aim of education [is] to help in correcting unfair privilege and deprivation,
not to help perpetuate them . . . . [T]he school becomes the chief means for the
reform of society toward a better condition. . . . Yet education is not limited to the
school.48
Dewey believed education to be a lifelong process: “Education is continuous travel through life
in which the only arrival to speak of is death.”49 This insight underscores education’s value to
democracy and its role in avoiding a descent into an undemocratic aristocracy or plutocracy.
Education is the ultimate access point to opportunity.50 Many in the U.S. believe that all

46. See generally ANNE MICHAELS EDWARDS, EDUCATIONAL THEORY AS POLITICAL
THEORY 81-96 (Avebury 1996) (summarizing John Dewey’s educational and political theories);
JOHN DEWEY, MY PEDAGOGIC CREED 430 (Nabu Press 2010) – I didn’t get this idea directly from
Dewey, but from Edward’s reference to him. Please cite this in a way give Edwards the
appropriate attribution for the framing of the summary.
47. Id. at 85-87.
48. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 87.
49. Id. at 95.
50. SEN, supra note 15, at 39 (“[P]olitical participation may be hindered by the inability
to read newspapers or to communicate in writing with others involved in political activities.”);
JOHN M ALEXANDER , CAPABILITIES AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF

should have an equal opportunity to obtain the basic skills necessary to succeed in life, even if
there is disagreement as to what those basic skills might include before some demonstration of
merit becomes necessary in order to be entitled to further education.51 There is significant
support for the modern need for higher education, here defined as any education after the twelfth
grade.52 This Article is focused on a matter of which there is even less dispute; the necessity for
providing access to high quality, primary and secondary education as a vehicle for providing the
equal opportunity that today’s concept of human dignity requires.53

II. EDUCATION IS ESSENTIAL TO DIGNITY
Dignity is fundamental to modern concepts of justice, and education is essential to human
dignity.54 Human dignity has been referenced by American judges with increasing frequency

AMARTYA SEN AND MARTHA NUSSBAUM 126 (2008) (“[T]he political community needs to
provide both the required level of material resources, education and social conditions for the
pursuit of the good life.”).
51. See ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 126. See also Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality
In Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2090 (2006).
52

Reference regarding higher education needed.
53. “Education,” unless specifically stated otherwise, refers in this Article to primary and

secondary education, which is the focus of this Article. Focusing on primary and secondary
education is not intended at all to indicate that higher education does not bring to bear similar
concerns and implicate a similar duty under the U.S. Constitution.
54. BETTY A. REARDON, EDUCATING
PDF]

FOR

HUMAN DIGNITY 5-7 (1995). [PLEASE

SEND
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since World War II.55 According to Leslie Meltzer Henry, there has been a resurgence of human
dignity-based decision making in the current Roberts Court.56 Human dignity has now become
the basis for much of international human rights law.57 Dignity was seen by Immanuel Kant as
flowing from the uniquely human consciousness and the ability to discern, make laws and
thereby shape reality.58 For Kant, dignity was something every human being had, simply by
virtue of being human.59
The modern view that dignity is fundamental to justice and that education is essential to
human dignity was shared by the late American education philosopher and psychologist, John
Dewey, who famously believed in an education-centered concept of meliorism.60 Dewey

55. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 169 n.
17-26 (2011). Please insert the footnote’s references here.
56. Id. at 169-173.
57. SEN, SUPRA NOTE 18, AT 226-27.
58. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 42-43 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)
59. Id. Kant argued that dignity is an end in itself. It does not have an instrumental
value, which has relative price or worth but rather dignity is an inner worth—something that is
intrinsically endowed on any rational and autonomous individual.
60. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 70 (discussing the process of progression that fulfills the
needs of the existing community and improves the existing life so that the future will be better
than the past); DEWEY, supra note 14, at 61-105 (arguing for the process of progress in society as

believed that the world can be improved through human action and that human action can be
inspired and improved through education.61 He criticized popular approaches to education as
creating followers and conformists rather than leaders and reformers who would be capable of
inspiring progress.62 For Dewey, “[t]he whole point of democracy is to provide the wherewithal
for change, for improvement.”63 Education was viewed by Dewey as essential to progress.64
“If some people within a democratic society are practically enslaved, even those who are
privileged suffer as a result.”65 This insight connects with then State Senator Barack Obama’s
acclaimed speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention:
It’s not enough for just some of us to prosper. For alongside our famous
individualism, there’s another ingredient in the American saga. A belief that
we’re all connected as one people. If there is a child on the south side of Chicago
who can’t read, that matters to me, even if it’s not my child. If there is a senior

dependent in the education of citizenry, which in turn leads to society that progresses improves
over time as a consequence of education being a social function).
61. The belief has much in common with what is considered the cornerstone of
progressive political ideology, which believes in progress through social and political change.
See James W. Ceaser, Progressivism and the Doctrine of Natural Rights, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
177, 177-95 (2012).
62. Please insert a reference to EDWARDS, supra note 43 at 78, then insert editor’s
suggestion as a see also. DOUGLAS J. SIMPSON & MICHAEL J.B. JACKSON, EDUCATIONAL
REFORM: A DEWEYAN PERSPECTIVE 272 (1997). [please send me a pdf of the suggested citation]
63. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 78.
64. REARDON, supra note 54, at 5-7. [PLEASE SEND ME A PDF]
65. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 75.
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citizen somewhere who can’t pay for their prescription drugs, and having to
choose between medicine and the rent, that makes my life poorer, even if it’s not
my grandparent. If there’s an Arab American family being rounded up without
benefit of an attorney or due process that threatens my civil liberties.66
Those famous words from 2004 continue to summarize the American ethic and observed reality
that deprivation and oppression anywhere in society is detrimental even to the most privileged
within that society. Protecting human dignity is therefore essential if the U.S. hopes to realize
the words on the Great Seal of the United States of E. Pluribus Unum – out of many one.
I begin this section by first examining the concept of human dignity and its relationship
to education.67 Education rights advocates and leaders have suggested various educational
approaches over the years, but a theme that most of these approaches share is an unstated but
widely understood goal of enhancing human dignity.68 I therefore examine the concept of

66. Senator Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the 2004 Democratic National
Convention (July 27, 2004).
67. KANT, supra note 58, at 24, 43.
68. See, e.g., Robin West, The Constitution and the Obligations of Government to Secure
the Material Preconditions for a Good Society: Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1902 (2001). West argues:
Many citizens of even prosperous democratic states cannot possibly enjoy such a
minimal threshold, furthermore, without some state involvement in the
distribution of resources, particularly with the inequalities that persist and threaten
to worsen today. States are required, by justice and goodness both, to treat
citizens with dignity, and with equal dignity at that.
Id. at 1902. See also Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65,

liberty, its general relevance to democracy, and its special relevance to American democratic
society. The idea of the individual and the protection of individual liberty are essential
components to democracy. Human dignity is essential to any meaningful concept of liberty, and
education is essential to dignity and democracy.
A. Defining and Applying Human Dignity
1. The Components of Dignity

The relationship between education and dignity is that education is essential to the
development of the capabilities necessary to be a fully realized human being.69 Human dignity
includes people’s freedom to pursue their ambitions without being unfairly or unjustly
hindered.70 Human dignity requires a degree of influence over those structures that occasionally
impinge on individual freedom. Hence, modern political and legal theory views the protection of

68–69 (2011) (discussing the concept of human dignity and relevant approaches to reaching it,
including negative and positive rights theories); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 60 (“Thomas
Jefferson and his fellow founding fathers wrote official declarations and papers that espoused a
civic philosophy that public education is essential to a democracy. They espoused normative
arguments favoring public education that have continued to be articulated by more contemporary
educational philosophers like John Dewey.”).
69. There is a necessary connection between autonomy and dignity, as Kant proclaimed
that “[a]utonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational
creature.” KANT, supra note 58, at 43.
70. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 35-40
(2004).[please send pdf]
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and respect for what is generally framed as “human dignity” as an essential function of any
modern government or political system.71 Such influence is relevant for ensuring that individual
liberty is not undermined without individual consent.72 Liberty is an essential component to
dignity, as is democracy.73
Leslie Meltzer Henry explains in The Jurisprudence of Dignity that the concept of dignity
is dynamic, so that its meaning depends on the context of its usage.74 In exploring the concept of
dignity in the constitutional law context, she finds, among other things, that the Court’s reliance
on dignity is increasing and the Roberts Court is accelerating that trend.75 A recent example of
this increased application of dignity-based arguments is the decision in Lawrence v. Texas.76
2. Lawrence v. Texas Applied Human Dignity to Expand Constitutional Rights

71. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 77-79.
72. JOSEPH WRONKA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 123-27 (1998). [please send pdf]

73. Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 498-502 (2009).
74. Henry, supra note 55, at 177, 186-188.
75. Id. at 171-172.
76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (ruling a Texas anti-sodomy statute
unconstitutional based on liberty, privacy, and dignity interest in having a safe zone for intimate
relationships).

Lawrence v. Texas underscores the current application of human dignity-based arguments
in construing and expanding U.S. constitutional rights. In Lawrence, the Court applied a human
dignity-based due process clause analysis to hold that a Texas sodomy law was an
unconstitutional infringement on the right to privacy.77
The facts of Lawrence involved local police responding to a neighbor’s noise complaint
to discover two men engaging in homosexual sodomy.78 Police arrested the men pursuant to the
Texas anti-sodomy law that was later challenged as an unconstitutional violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.79 Here, the Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, holding that the
right to privacy protects the right to be free from invasive governmental intrusion into a private
sexual encounter between consenting adults because a right to privacy in such an intimate setting
is essential to human dignity.80

77. Id.
78. Id.; James Paulsen, The Significance of Lawrence v. Texas, 41 HOUS. LAW. 32, 33
(2004) (discussing the facts of the case and how Justice Kennedy’s analysis that stressed dignity
and liberty is a better approach than using Equal Protection Clause and that the case signifies a
shift from privacy jurisprudence to liberty centered rationale).
79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63.
80. Id. (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right
to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons.”); Yoshino, supra note 22, at 779 (discussing the
importance of the Lawrence Court’s liberty-based dignity analysis, which could be asserted more
often in the future); Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony Kennedy

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT
EDUCATION RIGHTS AND THE NEW DUE PROCESS, 47 Ind. L. Rev. __ (Forthcoming 2014).

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion explicitly relied on the concept of dignity as the basis
for recognizing a protected “zone of liberty.”81 Kennedy’s interpretation ultimately broadens the
Court’s liberty doctrine and effectively broadens the scope of recognized constitutional rights.82
The liberty doctrine is broadened by applying and interpreting a concept that is never explicitly
mentioned in the text of the Constitution, human dignity.83 “These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”84
The Court has thus demonstrated its continuing willingness to first, recognize and enforce
extra-textual constitutional rights, in the form of fundamental rights, and to interpret those rights

and the Concept of Emergent Rights, 69 ALB L. REV. 237, 238-239, 280-282 (2005) (discussing
that liberty-centered approach is a better way to frame fundamental rights, that an Equal
Protection analysis may be deemed erroneous with intolerable results (like the State could have
banned sodomy altogether), and that the concept of emergent rights can be support by the
analysis in Lawrence).
81. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562; Parshall, supra note 92, at 239.
82.
Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REV. 65, 68–69 (2011).
.
83. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 .
84

Id.

using extra-textual terms.85 The Lawrence decision also demonstrates the Court’s willingness to
interpret those rights by applying a particular extra-textual concept, human dignity as it relates to
liberty.86 A similar human dignity-based interpretation of the due process clause can be applied
to recognize a right to public education.
B. Education is Essential to the Liberty Component to Human Dignity
I have suggested that human dignity has two major components, a liberty component and
a democracy component. Education is essential to the liberty component of human dignity
because education is a basic human capability that is necessary to achieve valuable human
functionings or achievements.87 Any denial of opportunities for individuals to develop their
capabilities undermines human dignity.88
1. Rousseau and Dewey Connect Education with Liberty and Dignity

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey have both suggested that education is essential
to individual liberty and human dignity. Rousseau’s education philosophy holds that education
is the vehicle through which the individual can be trained to fully participate in society.89 In the
Emile, Rousseau set out his paradigm for educating children as a vehicle for improving society,

96. Citation needed.
86. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) .
87. AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES, 7, 9 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
(“A functioning is an achievement of a person, what he or she manages to do or to be.”).
88. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 18-20.
89. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 7.
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the individual, and the political community.90 Rousseau uses the example of educating a boy
named Emile to examine education and development through childhood and emphasizes the
significance of developing a child’s capabilities and ensuring individual autonomy and liberty
through education.91
Likewise, the more modern education philosophy of John Dewey calls for enhancing
individual liberty by way of guaranteeing opportunities to learn and develop essential
capabilities.

90. Id. Among his important contributions is the idea that education should be in
harmony with the development of the child’s natural capacities by a process of apparently
autonomous discovery. Id. [Also consider citing to Emile] Learning by way of autonomous
discovery, otherwise known as discovery based learning, is frequently applied in the legal
academy by way of a strategy popularly known as the Socratic method. [Citation needed.] [I’m
happy to include an Emile reference. Please pdf the relevant section]
While specific pedagogical method evaluation is beyond the scope of this article, it is
within the scope to recognize that notwithstanding the costs and benefits to the autonomous
discovery approach, there is an underlying philosophy of respecting individual autonomy and
attempting to reinforce it when educating through a process of self-discovery. Discovery based
learning, in part, is meant to cultivate individual liberty by encouraging independent thought and
understanding. While Rousseau’s methods from Emile have been critiqued for their
effectiveness in cultivating individual liberty, this was clearly a central goal for Rousseau.
91. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 100.

In educating to produce the ‘best’ person, Dewey stresses the freedom of the
individual. . . . Their own particular talents, abilities, and qualities are to be
developed in accord with their own nature. . . . The success and happiness of the
individual is impossible without the individual being an integral part of the group,
the society.92
Thus, Dewey emphasized individual freedom, development of capabilities, and acculturation into
democratic society as cornerstone goals for education. Dewey, much like Rousseau, was
“primarily interested in the development of the qualities [and] capacities which . . . make up
autonomy.”93 In order for there to be any meaningful concept of personal liberty, as defined by
the capability to think and act independently, both Rousseau and Dewey believed education was
necessary. “An enormous part of personal liberty for Dewey [was what he referred to as]
freedom of intelligence, observation, or judgment. . . . [P]eople cannot become significantly
more autonomous without freedom of expression.”94
For Dewey, education was a necessary component to being able to think well enough to
effectuate the basic civil liberty of free expression. Dewey’s approach foreshadowed the
contemporary capabilities approach.95 Indeed, both Dewey and today’s capabilities theorists
share an insight regarding the fundamentality of education in protecting and advancing human
dignity.96

92. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 9-10. See also DEWEY, supra note 14, at 15 (arguing
that education is a social function and that a person needs society to be educated and in turn,
society as a whole benefit).
93. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 6.
94. Id. at 73.
95
96
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2. Education is a Basic Human Capability

Education is a basic human capability that is necessary for advancing both liberty and
human dignity under Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.97 The
capabilities approach is particularly relevant to the discussion of an education right because it has
become an internationally embraced modern theory of justice that shares an American embrace
of equal opportunity while accepting some social and economic inequality when it is a
consequence of mertiocracy.98
The capabilities approach holds that the well-being of the people in a society should be
assessed by the capabilities of the people living within that society to obtain what Sen describes
as “valuable functionings,” which can be thought of as important life achievements.99 Valuable
achievements include such important components to life and liberty as education, as well as

97. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 15, at 5 (“What people can positively achieve is influenced
by economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good
health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives.”).
98. Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 46-47. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at ix-xii.
Id. at x.
99

The capabilities approach is an approach to evaluating a society based on the capability of
the people within the society to “achieve valuable functionings.” ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at
56 (citing Sen’s work). Under the capabilities approach, “functionings” refers to individual
achievements and what individuals manage to do or become. See SEN, supra note 98, at 7-9. A
just political system or ideal society is a society that enhance people’s capabilities, where
capabilities refers to what “reflects the various combinations of functionings [a person] can
achieve… and, “a functioning is an achievement of a person what he or she manages to do or to
be.” Id. at 7.

food, self-respect, and political participation.100 Absent such valuable achievements, quality of
life and meaningful freedom is undermined.101 Capabilities can be simply defined as access or
opportunity to achieve.102 It is the capability to achieve and not the achievements themselves
that are of central concern under the capabilities approach. Notably, under the capabilities
approach, education is both an achievement and a capability.103
Sen has suggested that access to certain fundamental services that advance human
capabilities must be considered when the United Nations and other international bodies evaluate
a society or a nation.104 Nussbaum has gone beyond Sen’s original approach and has generated a
list of ten basic capabilities that are necessary for governments to guarantee; among those ten

100. See SEN, supra note 15, at 3 (arguing that freedom is contingent on social and
economic arrangements that include facilities for education and health care).
101. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 17-18.
102. “A just political system or ideal society is a society that enhance people’s
capabilities, where capabilities refers to what “reflects the various combinations of functionings
[a person] can achieve… and, “a functioning is an achievement of a person what he or she
manages to do or to be.” SEN, supra note 98, at 7, 9.
103. ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 2. See also Amartya Sen, Capability and Wellbeing, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 31 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen Eds., 1993) (stating
that “[t]he capability of a person reflects alternative combinations of functionings the person can
achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection.”).
104. SEN, supra note 18, at 226-27.
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basic capabilities is education.105 Nussbaum specifically advocates for the fundamentality of
education and a few other essential rights as precursors to liberty and democracy.106 The
capabilities approach as an economic and legal theory today influences international evaluative
criteria for a nation’s well-being to the point that the United Nations Development Programme
now uses capabilities approach inspired measurements as developmental goals, as bases for
evaluating progress, and in formulating objective measures for comparing nations.107
As both Sen and Nussbaum have noted, without an education an individual cannot
meaningfully engage in political deliberation.108 Additionally, education is the vehicle for
potentially furthering other basic human achievements such as longer life expectancy and good
health, as well as the more complex human achievements of self-respect and social status.109 If
we translate capabilities as shorthand for equal opportunity, then we see education as the

105. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 33-34. This is unlike Sen, who refuses to suggest a
list of capabilities because he believes that any list ought to be the product of a deliberative
democratic process and not dictated by experts and theorists. ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 64.
See generally SEN, supra note 15; Nussbaum, while sharing Sen’s commitment to democratic
decision-making, argues for protecting a basic list of those capabilities that are so essential to
Aristotle’s concept of “truly basic human functioning.” ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 125;
NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 125-131 (summarizing the views of Aristotle and the Stoics).
106. Id. at 33-35.
107

See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 16, 19-20, 29-33, 78-79.

ultimate capability, and essential to any meaningful conception of dignity and freedom.
3. Equal Opportunity to Achieve is Essential to Liberty
Equal opportunity in the form of equal access to public education is essential to liberty.
The U.S. embraces individual liberty both politically and socially, so that respect for individual
liberty and human dignity requires that individuals not be arbitrarily barred from developing
their capabilities. 110 Stated differently, equal and fair opportunity is essential to American
liberty.
During a less enlightened time in U.S. history it was acceptable for housing and
occupation options to be limited based solely on place of birth, race, or gender. 111 All other
limitations violate our principle of equality, which is itself based in a concept of meritocracy.
Despite progress in advancing human dignity, even today everyone is not entitled to work and
live wherever they want, but rather, people can live and work wherever they want only to the
extent that their abilities and individual merit entitles them to that privilege. Hence, our concept
of human dignity has transformed from one that is limited by immutable characteristics into one

110. A corollary to this national faith is the belief that government should play a role in
removing arbitrary and unjust barriers to attaining the capabilities necessary for valuable
achievements such as wealth and status. RAWLS, supra note 75, at 63, 87-88.
111. RAWLS, supra note 75, at 87. John Rawls discusses undeserved merit. “The
naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the
costs of training and education and for using the endowments in ways that help the less fortunate
as well. No one deserves his greater capacity nor merits a favorable starting place in society.”
Id.
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that is only limited by individual merit, ability or achievements.112
Today, the concept of American meritocracy is applied to help justify what are clear
affronts to human dignity. For example, the unsafe and unclean living conditions of the
impoverished are justified based on an unstated assumption that those who are impoverished those who have less than they would need to function in a dignified manner – are where they are
because they are somehow underserving. Under this ideology, poverty demonstrates that the
impoverished lack the merit that would afford them the privileges of the more deserving, the
more dignified. That human dignity is intrinsic to all human beings is a truism that still
continues to have a qualifier, a qualifier based in merit. The concept of merit is itself justified as
flowing from a respect for individual liberty. Underlying both the conceptions of merit and
liberty is another qualifier, equal opportunity.
The existence of equal opportunity – an equal and fair chance to become capable of
achieving – provides the popular justification for what are obvious affronts to human dignity in
the forms of actual inequality of resources, power, and privilege.113 Despite a respect for human
dignity, such inequalities are acceptable under a meritocratic system that purports to reward the
best and brightest who have achieved success in a fair political, legal and economic system that

112. See id. at 87-88.
113. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
550, 595 (1992).

guarantees fair and equal access.114
Some undesirable and unjust inequality might be logically expected given that no human
system is perfect. 115 However, America’s failure to adequately and equally provide meaningful
opportunities for the children of low-income and minority parents to develop their capabilities is
consistent and systemic and not random.116 This failure must be corrected because these failures
undermine the ability of these children to develop their individual capabilities and therefore
undermines their liberty to pursue their goals.117

114. Id. at 551, 618.
115. Such acceptance would be based in a pragmatic view that secular and religious
philosophies have at times begrudgingly accepted; such notions as “the poor will always be with
us” and “to err is human” encapsulate that even idealistic models recognize the limitations of
human capabilities. ALEXANDER POPE, POPE’S ESSAY ON CRITICISM PAGE (Frederick M. A.
Ryland ed., Blackie & Son 1900) (1711). “To err is human to forgive divine” - Alexander
Pope, An Essay on Criticism; Bible Quote: Mark, Chapter 14, v. 7.
116. See supra Part I – the nature of the problem section. SEN, supra note 15, at 3-5.
This situation is not based in the inevitability of human failure or the tragedy of imperfect human
institutions. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 1637, 1662-1664 (1999).
117. See Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1917 (2004). See also Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting The
Poor Through The Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 18 (1969); Frank I. Michelman,
In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View Of Rawls’ Theory Of Justice, 121 U. PA.
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Individual liberty has long been recognized as essential to democracy. Education
philosopher and historian, Anne Michaels Edwards notes, “[w]hatever else education is, and
whatever other goals it may have, it is clear that one of the goals of any and all education is a
particular kind of person.”118 Edwards, like others, recognizes that central to any system of
education is a goal of inculcating the values necessary to function within a particular social and
political system.119 Therefore, it is important to appreciate that in the American context,
education is concerned with using public education to inculcate democratic values such as a
concept of individual liberty.
C. Education is Essential to the Democratic Component to Human Dignity
Education is essential to the democratic component of human dignity because at the heart
of democracy is the protection of individual autonomy.120 As A. John Simmons has noted, for

L. REV. 962, 991 (1973); Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 203, 210 (2008).
118. EDWARDS, supra note 42, at 2.
119. Id. at 2-3.
120. Thus, the underlying theory is that the only legitimate system for passing laws that
may constrain individual liberty is a form of government that functions with the consent of the
individual’s being governed. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE

OF

GOVERNMENT 55 (C. B.

Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690) (“[T]he governments of the world, that were
begun in peace, had their beginning . . . , and were made by the consent of the people; there can
be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice of

Locke, individuals ought not to be “obligated to support or comply with any political power
unless he [or she] has personally consented to its authority.”121 Locke’s government consent
ideal is based in a respect for the liberty component of human dignity that is closely linked with
the Greek roots for democracy, which literally translates to “rule by the people.122 Democracy,
with its attendant requirement of popular consent, is an essential component to furthering human
dignity.123 Hence, at its very root, democracy is defined as the ultimate respect for liberty, the

mankind, about the first erecting of governments.”). See also Rousseau, supra note 101, at 148149.
121. A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
274, 274 (1976).
122. Id. at 714. According to Locke:
Every man, as has been shewd, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into
subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be
understood to be sufficient declaration of a man’s consent, to make him subject to the laws of
any government. LOCKE, supra note 157, at 63; See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 275 (defining
“democracy” as “any regime in which the ‘people’ (dēmos) rule or control the authoritative
institution of the city; more properly, rule of the poor or the majority in their own interests”).
123. John Locke’s model is not without its criticisms. Hume famously objects to John
Locke’s consent theory as described in Locke’s social contract based on its concept of “tacit
consent.” See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 490 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1739). See also Simmons, supra note 163, at 274.
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freedom of the people to make their own choices by deciding their own legal constraints.124
1. Theories of Dignity and Education have Progressed Alongside Theories of Liberty
and Democracy
The idea of the individual and the attendant concepts of dignity, democracy and public
education, have developed together through a related historical progression towards greater
respect for the dignity, capabilities, and rights of people.125 Classical thinkers like Plato and
Aristotle did not believe each person ought to participate in politics and governance nor did they
believe that every citizen needed a shared baseline of education.126 Plato and his student,
Aristotle, instead believed in a form of aristocracy where the most innately brilliant and qualified
would govern and that only those selected aristocrats ought to be educated enough to participate
in governance and political decision-making.127 The aristocrats would be the ruling elite and
124. Rousseau, supra note 101, at 162 (“Strictly speaking, laws are merely the
conditions of civil association. The populace that is subjected to the laws ought to be their
author.”).
125. ROSEN, supra note 57, at __.
126.
127. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 129 (“Only the regime that is made up of those
who are best simply on the basis of virtue . . . is justly referred to as aristocracy . . . .”). See also
NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 129-130 (discussing how the Stoics put their theories into practice
when they campaigned for the equal education of women, one former slave (Epictetus) and one
foreigner (Seneca)). Id. at 492; Plato, The Republic Book VI, in THE PORTABLE PLATO PAGE,
510-512 (Scott Buchanan ed. & Benjamin Jovett trans., Penguin Books 1977) (DATE).

therefore needed to have a certain freedom to think and an education sufficient to ensure that
they were capable of properly ruling.128 It is notable that despite their restrictive theories of
governance, both Plato and Aristotle recognized public education of the ruling elite as essential
to responsible governing.129
Later, Rousseau suggested a broader scope for who ought to be educated, but, like the
classical thinkers, he continued to believe that there ought to be a class of people not involved in
governing.130 Rousseau believed that for that non-governing class of people, liberty should be

Until philosophers are kings, or the king and princes of this world have the spirit and
power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner
natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will
never have rest from their evils—no, nor the human race, as I believe,---and then only will this
our state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.
128. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 129; NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 129-130.
129. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 229 (“Since there is a single end for the city as a
whole, it is evident that education must necessarily be one and the same for all . . . .”).
130. Rousseau and other Enlightenment era thinkers adopted broader views regarding
the scope of who ought to be educated and trained for governance. However, even Rousseau
believed that certain classes of people and forms of work were unsuitable for active participation
in politics and governance, and hence, members of such classes were not seen as needing
education. See Michalina Clifford-Vaughan, Enlightenment and Education, 14 BRIT. J. OF SOC.
135, 135-136 (1963). Dennis Diderot was another enlightenment thinker who valued education
as much as “[d]isciples of Rousseau, the legislators of the First Republic wanted to make citizens
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constrained by the educated ruling class because the non-ruling class’ preferences were irrelevant
and potentially hostile to social order.131 This history of education and liberty parallels Michael
Rosen’s history of the meaning of dignity.132 Dignity, like education was initially viewed as an
exclusive privilege for the powerful ruling elites.133 Today the concept of dignity has been
expanded to apply to all human beings.134
Likewise, democracy has not historically been the most widely used or preferred system
of government; that has changed as the idea of the individual and the concept of human dignity
has been broadened to grant a broader range of people individual liberty and freedom.135 Liberty
has different meanings and is arguably more constrained in the contexts of autocracy,
aristocracy, and plutocracy.136 Democracy, given its central concern with majority consent,

free by liberating their minds from prejudice through education.” Id. at 135. ARISTOTLE, supra
note 12, at __; ARISTOTLE, supra note 168, at __.
131. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at __; ARISTOTLE, supra note 168, at __.
132. ROSEN, supra note 57, at __.
133. Id. at __.
134. Id. at __.
135. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 97 (“What makes democracy and oligarchy differ is
poverty and wealth: whenever some rule on account of wealth, whether a minority or a majority,
this is necessarily an oligarchy, and whenever those who are poor, a democracy.”).
136. These forms of government are all quite unlike our modern U.S. democracy, where
an individual’s liberty to make life decisions is constrained by laws that are passed by

provides the greatest respect for individual liberty for the greatest number of individuals.137
Plutocracy, which literally means “rule by the wealthy,” does not similarly value the concerns of
all the people, but only those of the wealthy.138 The democratic and dignity-based critiques of
plutocracy directly apply to current fears regarding a rising “corporatocracy;”139 the concerns

representatives of the people. Aristocracy has as its Greek root “aristocratia,” which literally
means “rule by the best,” where “aristoi” means “the best.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
XX (2d ed. 2010). Autocracy is the authority of the autocrat, the government in which one
person possesses unlimited power. Id. at __. Autocrat is defined as a monarch with unlimited
power. Id. at __. In an autocracy, governance by a single ruler, the concept of autonomy and the
related freedom of the individual to make life choices would be seen as being properly limited by
the will of the autocrat, who could be a monarch or dictator.
137.
138. Plutocracy has as its root Pluto, the god of the underworld. Pluto is less widely
known as the god of wealth and treasure. The Greek root of the word plutocracy is “plutos,”
which means “wealth” in Greek. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY __ (2d ed. 2010).
139. See Priti Nemani, Note, Globalization Versus Normative Policy: A Case Study on
the Failure of the Barbie Doll in the Indian Market, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 96, 99-100; see
also Thayer Watkins, The Economic System of Corporatism, SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY,
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/corporatism.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). Watkins
states:
The basic idea of corporatism is that the society and economy of a country should
be organized into major interest groups (sometimes called corporations) and
representatives of those interest groups settle any problems through negotiation
and joint agreement. In contrast to a market economy which operates through
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regarding rule by wealthy interest groups whose only governing morality is the enhancement of
their group’s wealth and power.140 As Priti Nemani notes:
Journalist John Perkins describes the advancement of the global empire as
a result of the omnipotent “corporatocracy,” a tripartite financial and political
power relationship between multinational corporations (“MNCs”), international
banks, and governments. The corporatocracy works to guarantee the unwavering
support and belief of its constituents schools, business, and the media--in the
“fallacious concept” of growing global consumer culture Members of the
corporatocracy promote common values and goals through an unceasing effort “to
perpetuate and continually expand and strengthen the system” of the current
global culture. Unfortunately, the global culture is not one of social understanding
and sensitivity to individual cultures; rather, the new global culture is one marked
by the ability to empower one’s citizens to consume as if product consumption is
the ultimate civic duty.141
Arguably, the potential erosion of civic virtue in the face of plutocratic governance models
coincides with a decrease in respect for individual liberty and human dignity. 142
Respect for individual liberty and the dignity of every human being has long been central

competition a corporate economic [sic] works through collective bargaining.
Id.
140. See Priti Nemani, Note, Globalization Versus Normative Policy: A Case Study on
the Failure of the Barbie Doll in the Indian Market, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 96, 99-100
(2011); JOHN PERKINS, CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN 26-28 (2005).
141. Nemani, supra note 183, at 99-100. See also PERKINS, supra note 183, at 26-28.
142. Linda L. Fowler, The Best Congress Money Can Buy, 6 ELECTION L.J. 417, 419
(2007); Rousseau, supra note 101, at 151 (“What man loses through the social contract is his
natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he can acquire. What
he gains is civil liberty and propriety ownership of all he possesses.”).

to the U.S. national creed.143 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, American democracy is
structured to further equality.144 In the U.S., the government and its leaders within it are defined
as subject to the people, so that those who lead are public servants and not rulers. 145
American democracy in its ideal form represents progress towards a more inclusive

143. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 94-95, 123-124, 175, 287288 (David Campbell trans., Everyman’s Library 1995) (1835, 1840).
144. Id.
145. This commitment to equality is not entirely unique to the U.S. Indeed, many
modern autocracies style themselves “constitutional monarchies” and recognize a realm of
individual liberty that even an autocrat may not infringe. However, the fundamental principle
underlying even these constitutional monarchies is that the people are subjects to the ruler and
thus sit beneath their government as subservient or subject to it . Id. According to Fowler,
Every election cycle sparks stories of wealthy candidates pumping
millions of their own money into campaigns to buy a seat in the House or Senate.
The successful ones prompt cries of alarm about plutocrats hijacking the
American democracy; the failures invite scorn for underestimating the capacity of
ordinary voters to refuse to be bought.
Id. at 417; See RAYMOND V. PADILLA, EPISTEMOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 8 (2004) (citing ROBERT K. GREENLEAF, DON M. FRICK & LARRY C. SPEARS,
ON BECOMING A SERVANT LEADER (1996)). According to Padilla,
Citizenship includes the cultivation of civic life and the creation of leaders as
public servants. Through the practice of leadership and civic life, a set of
relations is established by each individual with society. It is within this set of
social relations that specific collective issues can be explored, such as justice,
ethics, philanthropy, politics, etc., issues having to do with our need to get along
with others and to lead productive lives.
Id. at 8.
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concept of human dignity. However, because each citizen is expected to be capable of
meaningfully participating in the political process, everybody, both the elected representatives
and those who elect them, needs to be educated enough to be capable of self-governance.146
2. Education is Essential to Democratic Society

Education philosopher John Dewey recognized that education is essential to democratic
society for reasons similar to those espoused by today’s capabilities approach theorists.147
“The task of democracy is the creation of freer experiences in which all participate . . . . If
democracy has an ideal meaning ‘it is that a social return be demanded from all and that
opportunity for development of distinctive capacities be afforded all.’”148
Dewey considered democracy as the most legitimate system of government because it educates
citizens so that they are capable of ruling.149
Likewise, Amy Gutmann also discusses the necessary constraints on democracy and
expounds upon the need for “more democratic education to make our politics more
democratic.”150 Like Dewey, Gutmann

146. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 76.
147. See id. at 85.
148. Id. at 76 (quoting DEWEY, supra note 14, at 122).
149. Id.
150. EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 118. In Liberal Equality, Gutmann argues that “people
who do not have a standard of living sufficient to secure basic welfare for themselves simply
cannot be expected to participate in politics as extensively and with as much political
information as the more advantaged.” EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 118 (quoting AMY

[I]n large part, opts for more of a collective control over education, but by
recognizing that a democratic education is one where many individuals and groups
have a say in the goals of education, she recognizes that parents, teachers, citizens,
and public officials, as well as the children themselves, must all have a hand in
determining goals, policies, and functions for the schools.151
Regardless of what policies are enacted, or what definition of “quality” is ultimately applied, to
be legitimate, quality definitions and school policies ought to be determined through a
democratic process.152
Gutmann recognizes the special importance of education to democractic society by
suggesting that as long as children are educated to a certain threshold for democratic
participation, there is no concern regarding equality in funding or resources.153 This insight
suggests a need for at least a minimally adequate public education.154 While Gutmann’s
perspective regarding minimum adequacy is somewhat inconsistent with a full commitment to
human dignity, at least she acknowledges that minimally adequate educational is essential to

GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 190 (1980)).
151. Id. at __.
152. For Gutmann, “the value of democratic deliberation is so great as to override ‘the
value of being governed by just laws that are not democratically enacted.’ Id. at 119 (quoting
AMY GUTMANN, HOW LIBERAL IS DEMOCRACY? 37 (1983)).
153. For Gutmann, the goal of education should be to ensure ‘“children learn enough to
participate effectively in the democratic process[.]’ . . . [I]t doesn’t require, however, that either
the ‘inputs’ or the ‘outcomes’ be equalized.” Id. at 120-21 (quoting AMY GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 170 (1987)).
154. See id. at 120-21.
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maintaining a functional democracy.155 Preservation of democracy is important, the principle
aim of both public education and democracy is to enhance human dignity by developing
individual’s capabilities.156
“[D]emocracy’s obligation to education goes beyond mere schooling. The state must
provide access to a variety of other goods and services – ‘decent housing, job training and
employment for parents, family counseling, day care and after-school programs for children,
etc.’”157
For believers in the modern, universal concept of human dignity, a possible reversion to
less democratic and less inclusive form of governance after millennia of long historical progress
in liberalizing the concept of human dignity is cause for concern.158 Whether the alternative
system of governance is autocracy, aristocracy, plutocracy, or some derivation thereof, in all
these other forms of governance, only the members of the select ruling class are expected to
obtain the basic education necessary to govern.159 Education is, as it always has been, essential

155. See Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 86.
156. From Gutmann’s perspective, positive rights connect together through what she
views as the most essential obligations of democratic government: the duty to provide public
education.
157

Id. (quoting AMY GUTTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 151 (1987)).
158. As compared to autocracy, the scope of those with influence over law and liberty

choices is expanded in an aristocracy and in plutocracy to include a group that is considered to
be particularly suited to make such decisions—whether because of birth right, talent, or wealth in
the case of plutocracy. However, that group remains small especially when compared to
democracy.
159.

to ensuring that true democracy continues.
Like the right to privacy, education is also essential to liberty. The connection between
education and liberty has been recognized in the classical, enlightenment era, and modern
philosophies of Aristotle, Rousseau, John Dewey, and today’s capabilities theorists.160 The case
for a human dignity-based constitutional protection for the right to public education is even
stronger than the already recognized human dignity-based constitutional protection for the right
to privacy. This is because, unlike the right to privacy, education is essential to both the liberty
component and to the democracy component of human dignity. Despite a broad consensus
regarding the importance of primary and secondary education, educational opportunity is
systematically denied to the children of racial-ethnic minorities and to underprivileged children

160. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 229 (“Since there is a single end for the city
as a whole, it is evident that education must necessarily be one and the same for all . . . .”);
DEMOCRACY: A READER, supra note 13, at 100 (Rousseau explains that “through the social
contract we gain civil liberty and moral liberty: the former involves being ruled by a general will
instead of our individual self-interest. The latter means obedience to rules which we, in
association with our fellow citizens, have made.”); supra note 13, at 11-15, 46-50, 54-60 JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 11-15, 46-50, 54-60 (G.D.H. Cole
trans., Dent 1958); DEWEY, supra note 14, at 4; SEN, supra note 15, at 4-5, 10-11, 36-49, 144.
See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 32-33. Among Nussbaum’s brief list of ten centrally
important capabilities is the capability for “Senses, Imagination, and Thought.” Id. at 33.
Nussbaum explains that the capability to think and reason in a “truly human” way requires an
adequate education. Id.
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of every race.161 No single factor is more indicative of the sort of education a child will receive
than the socioeconomic status of that child’s parents.162 As stated, systemic failures are not
incapable of correction. However, U.S. Constitutional law doctrine has gotten in the way.
III. FAILURES OF EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
Equal Protection clause jurisprudence has retreated from the early commitment to equal
access to high quality, public education that the Court demonstrated in Brown v. Board of
Education.163 Brown demonstrated an unambiguous recognition that public education is
important.164
Since Brown, there has been a marked jurisprudential shift away from this recognition by
the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court, and today’s far right-of-center Roberts Court.165 The
Court has all but abandoned its earlier “equality jurisprudence” in favor of a “liberty-centered
jurisprudence,” which it wrongly perceives as being in conflict with the principle of equality.

161. Chambers, supra note 31, at 55-59.
162. Id.
163. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
164. Id.
165. Yoshino, supra note 22, at 748. According to Yoshino,
The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court reflects this pluralism
anxiety. Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied constitutional
protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited
Congress's capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation. The Court
has repeatedly justified these limitations by adverting to pluralism anxiety. These
cases signal the end of equality doctrine as we have known it.
Id.

Equality remains a fundamental principle of American democracy, but because of the Court’s
negative rights bias, it has failed to recognize how equality and liberty can be reconciled.166
The negative rights bias refers to the concern that the Court favors negative rights, which
are otherwise referred to as liberties, over positive rights, which are otherwise referred to as
duties.167 The Court’s preference towards recognizing liberties, which have been defined as
freedoms from government action, has animated a libertarian perspective that has driven our
constitutional jurisprudence to the point that the Court is so deeply biased against recognizing the
most obvious situations where government ought to have a duty to act.168

166. See id.; SUNSTEIN, supra note 219, at 13 (noting the inclusion and importance of
“the right to a good education” in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights);
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 123
(2004) (concluding that federal courts have been “tragically wrong” in failing to find a
constitutional right to education); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship,
116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (arguing that the federal government has a constitutional duty to
ensure that every child has the opportunity to receive an education).
167. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978) (1935). See also Osiatynski,
supra note 13, at 233 (declaring that “[s]ocial and economic rights differ from civil liberties and
political rights in that they call for positive action by the state to provide some citizens but not
others with goods and services”).
168. See Jenna MacNaughton, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to Graft,
Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 759-61 (2001). See also Frank B. Cross, The Error
of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 913-14 (2001).

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT
EDUCATION RIGHTS AND THE NEW DUE PROCESS, 47 Ind. L. Rev. __ (Forthcoming 2014).

Education is an obvious example of where there is a well-recognized duty to fairly and
equally provide quality education.169 A right to public education is obviated by the modern
concepts of human dignity and related democratic theory-based support for the duty of
government to ensure a well-educated citizenry.170 Additionally, each state within the U.S. today
recognizes a right to public education. Despite the fact that each of the United States recognizes
this duty, the Supreme Court would have us believe that the United States Constitution does
not.171
The Court was clearly wrong in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

169. See Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Strengthening the Duty to Provide Public
Education, 72 FLA. B.J., no. 9, 1998, at 28, 34.
170. See KANT, supra note 58, at 40-41. See also ROSEN, supra note 57, at _; Henry,
supra note 55, at 171-173 (discussing the concept of dignity being a governing notions in many
cases).
171. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education
. . . is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223
(1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this
country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ Nor is education a
fundamental right; a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner
in which education is provided to its population.”).

when it declared that there is no right to public education.172 The Court has not always gotten
this wrong.173 Brown v. Board of Education and other Warren Court era decisions indicate a
prior willingness to consider freedom and equality from more than a negative perspective.174
However, from the Burger Court onward, the Supreme Court has been redefining equality and
freedom from a libertarian perspective, without appreciation for the basic tools and access

172. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
173. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (holding public school
segregation unconstitutional); Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The
Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 762 (2008).
See also Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstance: Accounting for
Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 485, 485-487 (1991) (arguing that the concept of
equal protection has probably raised and dashed more expectations of social progress than any
other constitutional provision and that the Equal Protection Clause has under-achieved its
promise). Lively argues:
[T]he Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence not only promised unitary
school systems but also equal educational opportunity. Such aspirations have not
been realized, however, and have actually been undercut by limiting constructions
of the amendment that have left educational equality interests substantially
unimproved or worse off. Recent decisions, despite their rhetoric, exhibit a
reluctance to confront the persistent reality of racial discrimination and suggest
that the usefulness of the equal protection guarantee as a means of accounting for
minority interests has been substantially undercut.
Id. at 489-90.
174. Greenspahn, supra note 228, at 762. Greenspahn argues that Brown clearly
recognized the fundamental right to education, but the Court has since retreated from the promise
of Brown. Id. at 776.
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required for any meaningful concept of liberty or democracy.175
One solution that is alluded to in the title of the Fifth Freedom is to conceive of education
as a liberty rather than as a duty.176 Deconstructing the negative versus positive rights dichotomy
to the point that a education, a positive duty of government, is treated as a freedom177 is a
strategy that could hold some promise beyond the education rights setting.178 So-called “false

175. Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 77-78. In that article, I argue that
The libertarian perspective is primarily concerned with maintaining existing
privileges and liberties, while deemphasizing the importance of positive rights or
duties. The libertarian perspective helps to enshrine an unjust distribution of
resources by protecting the rights of the unfairly privileged to maintain exclusive
privileges.
Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 83.
177

Id. at 47.
178. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology And The Peremptory

Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 78-79 (1993) (“The theoretical limitations of
colorblindness arise from its obsession with procedure and its willful ignorance of results.
Colorblind analysts tinker with the rules but need not attend to the outcome of the game.
Richard Delgado calls this preference for equality of opportunity over equality of result a false
dichotomy.” (footnote omitted)); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices
And The Limits Of Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 363, 389 (1996) (“The process of
counterbalancing white individuals' private interests against government programs that promote
racial equality sets up a false dichotomy between private choices on the one hand and
government action on the other.”). See also Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional

dichotomies” in law tend to reify legally constructed differences to the point of creating
unnecessary policy challenges.179 Such a false dichotomy arguably exists in the context of
negative versus positive rights.180 Education is a liberty, the liberty that President Lyndon B.
Johnson famously referred to as “the freedom from ignorance.”181

Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992); Mark Tushnet, The Left Critique of Normativity: A
Comment, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2325 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political
History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 845
(1990).
179. See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State
and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 710 (2000). See also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Making The Right Case For A Constitutional Right To Minimum Entitlements, 44
MERCER L. REV. 525, 535-36 (1993).
180. See Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights As A Critique of the Liberal
Paradigm, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 763, 764-65 (2003). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 233, at
535-536 (arguing for the affirmative duty of government to provide basic entitlements as
Constitutional rights, including education); Liu, supra note 153 (modifying and formulating
theory of social welfare rights, which justify and include the positive right to education).
181. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Education: “The
Fifth Freedom,” PUB. PAPERS 54 (Feb. 5, 1968) (“The fifth freedom is freedom from ignorance.
It means that every[one], everywhere, should be free to develop his talents to their full
potential—unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race or birth or income.”). See Imoukhuede,
supra note 1, at 61.
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A. Early Proclamations regarding Importance of Education
1. Education was Viewed as Essential to Component to Freedom during Reconstruction
Education has long been recognized and officially proclaimed as especially important by
America’s founding leaders, law makers, and judges.182 America’s founders shared the
previously described recognition that education is fundamental to democracy.183
Education’s significance continued to be emphasized through declarations in the postCivil War Reconstruction era by various leaders who recognized the importance of education to
the freedom and full citizenship for the newly freed slaves.184 During the Reconstruction, the
federal agency known as the Freedman’s Bureau worked to do many things in order to help
integrate the newly freed slaves into society, including establishing public schools throughout the
South, where none had previously existed.185 Senators Blair, Hoar, and Perce were among the

182. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Amending the Constitution of William and
Mary, and Substituting More Certain Revenues for Its Support (1779), in EDUCATION IN THE
U.S., supra note 40, at 745-47; Thomas Jefferson, From Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe
(Aug. 13, 1786), in EDUCATION IN THE U.S., supra note 40, at 750-51; Thomas Jefferson, Notes
on the State of Virginia(1801), in EDUCATION IN THE U.S., supra note 40, at 747-51.
183. See generally SAMUEL KNOX, AN ESSAY ON THE BEST SYSTEM OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION, ADAPTED TO THE GENIUS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1799).
184. W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 638 (Atheneum 1975).
185. Id. at 647-48.

greatest proponents for establishing these “freedmen’s schools.”186 They and other proponents
of education legislation respected the centrality of education to any meaningful concept of liberty
and full democratic citizenship and political participation.187
The Reconstruction Era freedmen’s schools were a manifestation of the social, political,
and legal recognition of the centrality of education to any meaningful concept of American
liberty and citizenship.188 As W.E.B. DuBois notes in his ground-breaking classic, Black
Reconstruction in America, these efforts to establish freedmen’s schools in the South were the
first efforts in the South to provide public education.189 Up until the Civil War, education in the
South was largely seen as an enterprise for the privileged few; hence, there was no system of
public schools prior to the efforts of African Americans and their northern allies.190 DuBois
discusses in his lauded historical work, Black Reconstruction in America, how the public schools
in the southern U.S. were founded:191
The first great mass movement for public education at the expense of the
state, in the South, came from Negroes. Many leaders before the [Civil War] had
advocated general education, but few had been listened to. Schools for indigents
and paupers were supported, here and there, and more or less spasmodically.
Some states had elaborate plans, but they were not carried out. Public education
for all at public expense was, in the South, a Negro idea.192

186. Id. at __.
187. Id. at 641.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 647-48.
190. Id. at 638
191.
192. Id. at 638.
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That free public education was a foreign concept to the South, imported from the North,
is hardly surprising given the substantially different pre-Civil War or antebellum economies of
both regions.193 The Northern economy was at the forefront of the global industrial revolution
and therefore an educated populace was centrally important, if not to labor, then to innovation.194
Whereas, the Southern economy an exploitative system of free slave labor, where the majority of
“free” southern whites were subsistence level laborers with little hope of sharing in the wealth
generated by such labor.195 Within this system, owners of property in the antebellum South did
not believe laborers needed education and therefore did not want to be taxed for it.196 This
further demonstrates the Southern ruling class’s adherence and continuing belief in an
undemocratic, Aristotelian model for aristocratic governance and restrictive access to
education.197
Poor white laborers also saw no need for being educated.198 According to DuBois, poor

193. Id. at 641.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See ARITOTLE, supra note 12, at 96 (defining “aristocracy” as “[rule] of the few (but
of more than one person) is called aristocracy—either because the best persons are ruling, or
because they are ruling with a view to what is best for the city and those who participate in it . . .
.”).
198. DUBOIS, supra note 238, at 641.

whites accepted “their subordination to the slaveholders, and looked for escape from their
condition only to the possibility of becoming slaveholders themselves.199 Education was
“regarded as a luxury connected with wealth.”200 The concept of education as a luxury good
may seem foreign to our modern understandings.201 Implicit to the current constitutional
doctrine that education is not a fundamental right is a belief that even if education is important, it
is something that people should find for themselves if they have the means. This again harkens
to a view of education that is inconsistent with modern views of democratic participation and
governance. In this case, the education limitation appears to follow Rousseau’s view that certain
forms of occupation were incompatible with the ability for self-governance and full education.202
According to DuBois, “[i]t was only the other part of the laboring class, the black folk,
who connected knowledge with power; who believed that education was the stepping-stone to
wealth and respect, and that wealth, without education, was crippled.”203 Southern public
schools owe their existence to the triumph of the North, the legitimizing of what began in the
pre-Civil War South as clandestine African American schools, and the post-Civil War Freedman
Bureau’s sponsorship of mixed and segregated public schools.204 These schools, founded after
the emancipation of the slaves, were the foundation for the creation of public schools throughout

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 665-66.
202. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 100.
203. DUBOIS, supra note 238, at 641.
204. Id. at 664-65.
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the South.205
Despite the Southern whites early and general disdain for public education, southern state
constitutions came to embody, at least on paper, a progressive approach to education.206 Some
states mandated systems of free, racially mixed, public schools.207 Some even went so far as to
create a duty for the legislature to construct a system of free, public education for children up to
the age of 21.208
Animating much of this was the previously-described recognition by the newly freed
women and men that education was the path to full constitutional personhood, to full human
dignity.209 DuBois recognized that early on local control was the enemy of educational progress,
explaining that “wherever there was retrogression, particularly in Negro schools, it can be traced
to the increased power of the county and district administrators.”210 African Americans and
their northern allies who helped fund these education reforms recognized the connection between
education and any meaningful conception of liberation.211

205. Id. at 664.
206. Id. at 665.
207. Id. at 637-669.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 639, 664-65.
210. Id. at 665.
211. Id.

2. The U.S. Supreme Court Revised its Rights Doctrine because of Education’s
Importance
Finally, in the rightly famous Brown v. Board of Education case,212 a Court that was
reluctant to end segregation in other contexts nonetheless found that education was so especially
important that segregation was not just morally wrong, but contrary to America’s foundational
law, the U.S. Constitution.213 This recognition in the context of education laid the foundation for
later holdings that racial segregation was unconstitutional in other contexts.214 It is noteworthy
that the end of segregation and “separate but equal” began with an education case.215
Despite obviously significant examples of the publicly-recognized social, political, and
legal significance of education, the U.S. Supreme Court has retreated from its doctrinal
recognition that education is especially important. 216 The Court has instead embraced a
confused conception of liberty over the duty to provide public education. Donald Lively argues

212. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
213. See U.S. CONST.; Katherine Tonnas, The Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education,
51 LA. B.J. 346 (2004).
214. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Tonnas, supra note 267,.
215. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
216. Greenspahn, supra note 228. Greenspahn argues that Brown clearly recognized the
fundamental right to education. Id. at 762. But the Court has retreated from the promise of
Brown. Id. at 772. Greenspahn suggests that San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of a right to public education. Id. at
768. However, Greenspan acknowledges that litigating for a fundamental right to education
would be useless because of the current Court’s reluctance to add rights. Id. at 783.
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that Brown was a good starting point for equal protection, but recognizes that the Court’s
subsequent failure to clearly define equality has led to the trampling of minority rights.217 Lively
states:
Absent an explicit command to actuate the equal protection guarantee in
comprehensive and substantive fashion, it is not surprising that the provision has
demonstrated limited utility in vindicating minority interests. Born of limited
aims and aspirations and crafted by a culturally homogeneous group, much like
the Constitution’s original provisions, the fourteenth amendment reflected the
influence of white superiority. The result was a fundamental but qualified
demand for racial equality limited to contract and property rights, individual
security and legal status.218
Education was important to the newly freed slaves and several bills were passed to ensure
that education was made available to them.219 Goodwin Liu explains that the Freedmen’s
Bureau and its education bills were enacted pursuant the newly-enacted Fourteenth
Amendment’s creation of national citizenship.220 National citizenship had not previously existed
in a clear and obvious fashion under the Constitution.221 With the creation of national citizenship
came a new responsibility to “extend educational opportunity to all children.”222 The

217. Lively, supra note 228.
218. Id. at 486-487.
219. Liu, supra note 221, at 335 (arguing that the federal government has a constitutional
duty to ensure that every child has the opportunity to receive an education); DUBOIS, supra note
238, at 637-69.
220. Liu, supra note 221, at 335.
221. Id. at 339.
222. Id.

Freedmen’s Bureau’s creation and charges were a legislative recognition by the U.S. Congress of
their duty under the Constitution to “enforce and give substance to the guarantee of American
citizenship” that was granted in the Fourteenth Amendment.223 As Liu notes, “guided by a
national standard of literacy for effective citizenship, the proposals envisioned a distribution of
aid that would lessen educational inequality across states.”224
B. Liberal Theories of Equality Effectively Abandon Equality as a Viable Principle of Justice
The primary weakness of the Equal Protection Clause as the Court is currently
interpreting it, is that rights may be violated, so long as they are violated equally. Such a
definition of equality is obviously problematic. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, it
effectively resurrect a theory of equality that was the foundation for the infamous “separate but
equal” doctrine.225 Plessy v. Ferguson226 and The Civil Rights Cases227 narrowly construed the
equality principle embedded within the equal protection clause to be limited to liberal equality.228
Together these cases served to limit the possibilities of the Fourteenth Amendment
generally.229 Of particular relevance here is that these cases completely undermined the central

223. 116 Yale L.J. 330, 394. “
224. Liu, supra note 221, at 395.
225. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547 (1896).
226. Id.
227. 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
228. Id.; Plessy, 163 U.S.
229. Id.
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equality concerns that inspired passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.230 Those concerns were
to further racial equality and to end institutionalized white supremacy in the form of legally
sanctioned slavery as well as the American racial caste system.231
As William Julius Wilson notes, the Court’s retrograde concept of liberal equality232 is
limited in that this concept of equality leaves out considerations of historical context, but instead
focuses almost exclusively on treating people identically.233 The sameness standard of liberal

230. See Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil
Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 483-84 (2006).
231. Id.
232. William Julius Wilson, Public Policy Research and the Truly Disadvantaged, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 461-479 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., Brookings 1991)
(criticizes the concept of colorblindness for not appealing to the reasons why minorities are poor
to begin with). See also Charles R. Lawrence III,The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that color-blindness
as advocated by classical liberals, who also use the term “formal equality,” is flawed due to the
fact that liberal conception of equality through color-blindness does not take into account
unconscious racism); Barbara Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See:” White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (arguing that
colorblindness fails, which is why liberal conception of equality also fails).
233. See Richard Delgado, Introduction to Critical Race Theory, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).

equality does not appreciate or adjust to concepts of social hierarchy or historical context.234
Under such an ahistorical approach, a law that mandates separate facilities based solely on race is
not necessarily furthering inequality unless it can be shown that the quality of those facilities are
themselves unequal.235 The social hierarchy that such a law reinforces is ignored. This liberal
construction of the equality principle was applied for over half a century in the form of the
infamous, separate but equal doctrine to validate segregation laws as consistent with the principle
of equality so long as the facilities were “equal.”236
The decisions in these cases flowed not from some outdated academic exercise that
yielded unintentionally unjust results. The Reconstruction Era Court’s members were
contemporaries of the Civil War Amendments’ framers and therefore had every reason to be
fully aware of the context of racial oppression, exclusion, and white supremacy that together
those amendments were meant to address.237 Yet, the Court chose to ignore the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment in order to weaken the scope of what ought to have been broad
protective powers to further a uniquely American conception of equality.238

234. See Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education As A Fundamental Right: Challenging the
Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 954 (1998).
235. Id. at 955.
236. See Martin Schiff, Reverse Discrimination Re-Defined As Equal Protection: The
Orwellian Nightmare in the Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627
(1985).
237. See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 304-05 (1998).
238. Id. See also Daniel R. Gordon, One Hundred Years After Plessy: The Failure of
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Today’s Supreme Court is in the process of reverting to Jim Crow Era constructions of
“equality” and therefore abandoned “equality” as a viable principle of justice.239 The Court’s
holdings in Rodriguez and later in Milliken v. Bradley demonstrate a transparent avoidance if not
outright abandonment of the principle of equality.240 These cases more closely resemble Plessy’s
doctrine of “separate but equal” than Brown and Brown’s progeny’s conclusion that separate is
inherently unequal.241
Absent robust protection of a right to high quality public education, minority and
economically disadvantaged children will have no recourse as the quality of their education
continues to erode.242 The previously referenced data and research demonstrates that the average

Democracy and the Potentials for Elitist and Neutral Anti-Democracy, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
641 (1996).
239. See Klarman, supra note 292, at304-05; Roy L. Brooks, American Democracy and
Higher Education for Black Americans: The Lingering-Effects Theory, 7 J. L. & SOC.
CHALLENGES 1, 11 (2005).
240. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
241. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1986); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
242. See Chambers, supra note 31, at 55-58 (arguing that racial and economic inequality
lead to inequality in opportunity to adequate education and to make matters worse, racial and
economic inequality are tied, thus minorities are prone to inadequate education).

quality of American education has fallen sharply.243 Minority and economically disadvantaged
children as a group, however, underperform even this already low and plummeting U.S.
average.244
According to Julius Chambers, schools that predominantly serve non-white children are
underfunded in comparison to majority white public schools.245 These funding differences have
been argued to be contributing factors in the overall performance gap between students
graduating from majority white versus majority non-white public schools.246 Similarly, schools
in impoverished and working class communities tend to be significantly underfunded compared
to more economically privileged public schools.247 Here again, these funding differences have
also been argued to be contributing factors to the overall performance gap between students
graduating from public schools in economically privileged communities.248 If there is currently
a general U.S. education crisis, then the education situation for racial and ethnic minorities and
working class children who as a group receive an even worse than average education is nearing a
state of complete dysfunction.

243. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial
Justice and Equity for African-American Males in the American Educational System: A Dream
Forever Deferred, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2006).
244. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19.
245. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19; Chambers, supra note 31, at 5-59.
246. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19.
247. Id.
248. Id..
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The decisions in these cases were not merely the result of some unintentional confusion
regarding how best to define equality.249 Much like the Reconstruction Era Court, which issued
contextually inconsistent and racially hostile rulings that effectively bolster what has been
referred to alternatively as a racial caste system or system of white supremacy, so too, the
modern Court has chosen to ignore the lessons from Brown: that Fourteenth Amendment
equality means more than just identical but separate facilities.250 Equality connects with the
Preamble’s acclamation to form “a more perfect Union.”251 The Supreme Court has all but
abandoned the principle of equality as a viable principle of justice in the education context.252
IV. PROTECTING HUMAN DIGNITY VIA THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
An alternative approach for recognizing a right to public education, based instead in a
due process clause analysis, would allow us to overcome the current Court’s libertarian bias and
equal protection clause limitations. The seeds of a new, expanded due process clause approach
can be found in Lawrence v. Texas, where the majority recognized a liberty interest in human
dignity.253 Lawrence ultimately expanded the scope for protecting the right to privacy by way of

249. See Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 51.
250. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483(1954).
251. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
252. Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 51.
253. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct.”). See Kenji Yoshino, supra note 22, at 749-750, 776-

a human dignity-based argument.254 Lawrence broadened the right to privacy to protect the
liberty to privately engage in intimate sexual relations based on the recognition that liberty is an
essential to human dignity.255 Hence, Lawrence agrees with the long held view that liberty is an
essential component to human dignity.256
An advantage to framing the education rights concern in terms of human dignity is that
human dignity is necessarily defined as an evolving standard that is inherently contextual as to
time and circumstances.257 Thus, a human dignity-based analysis has the potential for
overcoming the current limits of the Equal Protection Clause analysis by inserting a contextual
component that is universally applicable.258
The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses are both central to our fundamental rights
doctrine.259 The Equal Protection Clause analysis of fundamental rights is primarily used to
protect people from being selectively deprived of their fundamental rights.260 The Due Process

780; James W. Paulsen, supra note 90, at 34-37 (arguing that the significance of Lawrence can
be extended to other contexts).
254. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
255. Id. at 567.
256. Id. at 574.
257. See Henry, supra note 55, at 171-173, 203-205, 209-212 (discussing a line of U.S
Supreme Court cases thatinvoke dignity).
258. See Yoshino, supra note 22.
259. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868).
260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868).
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Clause analysis is primarily concerned with whether a right even exists.261 One component of
the San Antonio v. Rodriguez analysis was a Due Process Clause determination that education is
not a fundamental right.262
Kenji Yoshino suggests that in Rodriguez, the Court conducted an equality-based due
process clause analysis that focused squarely on the fundamentality of the right to public
education and on wealth as a suspect classification.263 While the Court has consistently avoided
identifying wealth as a separate suspect classification,264 as Yoshino notes, the Court has in other
contexts found ways to protect the impoverished by applying its liberty-based analyses to protect
against blatant forms of discrimination.265
A. Xenophobia Animates Modern Judicial Abandonment of Equal Protection
Kenji Yoshino suggests that rather than directly acknowledging the racial, ethnic, and
other group based inequalities in education and other areas, the Court prefers to avoid finding an

261. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868).
262. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Imoukhuede,
supra note 1, at 71.
263. See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 791 n.311.
264. Id. at 790-91 (discussing the Court’s unwillingness to recognize the poor as suspect
class); Id. at 791 n.311. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22-25 (holding that wealth-based
classifications do not draw heightened scrutiny).
265. Yoshino, supra note 22, at 790-91.

Equal Protection Clause concern.266 For Yoshino, the solution to this avoidance of the Equal
Protection clause is to instead frame inequality concerns in terms that universalize the
application of a liberty interest and in so doing obscure any group based inequalities and
subordination concerns.267 Obscuring the subordination aspects of such cases is among the
purported advantages of a liberty based dignity approach.268 This Article joins Yoshino in
endorsing a dignity-based due process clause analysis.269 However, obscuring the truth is rarely
if ever advantageous, especially when dealing with matters of justice.270
Yoshino’s human dignity approach suffers from at least two problems. First, it frames
the central animating concerns regarding Equal Protection in terms of the seemingly benign
concept of “pluralism anxiety,” 271 which obscures what truly animates the decreasing
effectiveness of the Equal Protection jurisprudence. The misleading characterization of
pluralism anxiety bleeds into the second problem, which is Yoshino’s failure to appreciate that
civil rights advocates, particularly education rights advocates, have long been pioneers in
framing equality concerns using the universalist concept of civil liberties.272 In fact, the

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-10 (1993).
271. Yoshino, supra note 22.
272. See MATSUDA, supra note 322, at __.
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infamous Rodriguez case is actually an emblematic example of advocates applying liberty-based
arguments to what could also have been framed as an equality concern. Despite applying this
universalist approach, the court still failed to recognize a fundamental right to public
education.273
Regarding the first problem, Yoshino’s concept of “pluralism anxiety,” is premised on
alleviating what he terms as a post-Warren Court, “pluralism anxiety,” which he defines as
“apprehension of and about [America’s] demographic diversity.”274 He sees this anxiety as
flowing from the legal recognition of “‘new’ kinds of people and ‘newly visible’ kinds of
people.”275 Pluralism anxiety is a new, euphemistic umbrella term for concepts that are all too
familiar. Where the “new” or “newly visible” are people with different national origins, such a
fear is typically described as xenophobia.276 Where those people are non-whites, such a fear is
called racism.277 Where the “newly visible” are women, then the fear is called sexism.278 Where
the “new” or “newly visible” are gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, or transgendered, the fear is called
homophobia. “Fear of outsiders” or “fear of the other” is what Yoshino’s “pluralism anxiety” is

273. See id.
274. Yoshino, supra note 22, at 751.
275. Id.
276. See MATSUDA, supra note 322, at __.
277. See id.
278. See id.

truly describing.279 Framed thusly, Yoshino’s observation is nothing new or controversial.
Using the term “pluralism anxiety” is problematic because it appears to white-wash foul views,
implicitly validating what is a disturbingly retrograde influence on American jurisprudence. The
term “xenophobia” more fully captures the concerns and motivations than the neutral sounding
and potentially misleading term “pluralism anxiety.”
Xenophobia under the classical definition of the term is etymologically the more
appropriate umbrella term for encapsulating these fears or “anxieties” because, despite its more
limited English language definition, its Greek roots literally mean fear of strangers, foreigners, or
in short, “fear of outsiders.”280 Xenophobia, used as a term to summarize this fear of outsiders,
crystallizes the value of human dignity as a counterbalance. Any fear that “we,” who view
ourselves as insiders, will lose power and privilege by fully dignifying the presence of outsiders,
can be countered by recognition that we and the outsiders are all human beings who have a
shared right to human dignity.281
The second concern that Yoshino introduces the universal concept of human dignity
without acknowledging that civil rights advocates have long been dealing with a xenophobiainspired, post-Brown jurisprudence by consciously invoking universalist themes, such as a right

279. See Yoshino, supra note 22.
280. The term “xenophobia” owes its etymology to the Greek. Its constituent roots are
the term “phobia,” which means “fear” or “fear of” and “xenos,” which means stranger or
outsider.
281. See id.
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to public education.282 What appears to be lost is what once upon a time was obvious. The term
“civil rights” itself embodies a universalist theme that is meant to resound beyond the limiting
and frequently dismissible confines of racial equality.283 Use of “civil rights” as a term is meant
to elevate these concerns for inclusion within the broader inclusive arena of American civil
liberties.284 Far from embracing a paradigm of difference, as Yoshino indicates, civil rights
advocates have consistently sought to universalize the struggle for civil rights and equality.285
Yoshino’s approach to overcoming xenophobia’s retrograde influence on equality fails to
appreciate the sophistication of civil rights advocates and thus mischaracterizes the scope of the
equality concerns,286 while exaggerating the liberty potential, especially in the context of public

282. Compare Yoshino, supra note 22, at 794 (arguing that application of a dignitybased approach would help overcome Rodriguez by approaching education issues not as issues
of equality, but as an issue regarding a due process clause-based right to public education).
283.
284. See LESLIE BENDER & DAAN BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL
RIGHTS READER (2d ed. 1995).
285. See JESSE L. JACKSON, JR. & FRANK E. WATKINS, A MORE PERFECT UNION:
ADVANCING NEW AMERICAN RIGHTS 330 (2001) (arguing for a proposed constitutional
amendment guaranteeing to all citizens the right to a high-quality public education); Martin
Luther King, Jr., Speech at the March on Washington: I Have a Dream (August 28, 1963),
available at http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf .
286. See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 751.

education.287
Race and ethnicity have long been problematic to invoke directly; this is why the
Rodriguez plaintiffs couched what was clearly an issue of Mexican-American school children
being denied equal educational opportunities as a question of liberty: their freedom to obtain a
public education.288 The plaintiffs went a step further in providing an opportunity for the Court
to avoid xenophobia concerns.289 They addressed the inequality aspects alternatively, in terms of
wealth-based inequality, thus giving the Court the option of avoiding the more inflammatory
xenophobic concerns regarding race and ethnicity.290 Yet, the Rodriguez Court failed to
recognize either a right to public education, or that this form of obvious and systemic
subordination of the children of the less fortunate violated either equality or due process.291
Rodriguez is just one of many examples of where sophisticated civil rights advocates were

287. Id. at 794 (arguing that application of a dignity-based approach would help
overcome Rodriguez by approaching education issues not as issues of equality, but as issues
regarding a right to public education).
288. Matthew A. Brunell, Note, What Lawrence Brought for “Show and Tell:” The NonFundamental Liberty Interest in a Minimally Adequate Education, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
343, 368 (2005); R. Craig Wood, Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance
Distribution Formulas: Moving from Equity to Adequacy, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 531, 535
(2004).
289. Yoshino, supra note 22, at 751.
290. Id.
291. See Brunell, supra note 345, at 353-54.
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thwarted in their creative attempts to apply universalist themes to class specific inequalities.292
Despite these weaknesses within Yoshino’s human dignity-based liberty approach, this
approach may still be helpful in furthering a right to public education.
B. Human Dignity as a Proxy for Education Rights
The Court’s failure to recognize a fundamental right to public education does not
necessarily foreclose the possibility that access to a high quality, public education can be
protected as a component to human dignity. A human dignity-based due process clause analysis
could be applied as a vehicle to affect a right to public education. This approach would be similar
to the Court’s application of the fundamental right to privacy as a vehicle for recognizing other
important rights, including women’s reproductive rights.293 More recently, the Court applied its
a dignity-based due process clause analysis to use the constitutional right to privacy to protect
the rights of homosexuals by protecting a broader right to intimate sexual relations.294
Lawrence broadened the right to privacy to protect the liberty to privately engage in
intimate sexual relations based on the recognition that liberty is essential to human dignity. 295
Hence, Lawrence agrees with the long held view that liberty is an essential component to human
dignity. The case for applying a dignity-based due process clause protection of the right to

292. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (discussing the right to education in the
context of undocumented alien children).
293. See Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
294. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
295. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

public education is even stronger for education than for the right to privacy. This is because,
unlike the right to privacy, education is essential to both the liberty component and to the
democracy component of human dignity.
Treating access to high-quality public education as a component to a fundamental right to
human dignity would fit well within already existing U.S. constitutional law doctrine. Human
dignity has already been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as fundamental to American
concepts of liberty and equality. Human dignity has already been applied by the U.S. Supreme
Court as a vehicle for protecting other rights, most notably, the right to privacy.296
The right to privacy has since been applied to add universal character to subordination
critiques involving women and homosexuals. The right to dignity’s potential to universalize
rights, avoids Yoshino’s xenophobia concerns. For as Lawrence demonstrates, when the Court
has been willing to correct for obvious inequalities, it would rather “universalize” rights rather
than confront the xenophobia-based fears that would come from recognizing a new suspect
classification. However, the goal is not to placate xenophobia but to overcome it.
Given that Lawrence applied dignity to interpret and expand the extra-textual but yet
judicially recognized fundamental constitutional right to privacy, this opens the door to finding
other dignity-based due process clause rights, including the right to public education.297
Obviously, the right to privacy is a negative right or liberty that fits squarely within the current

296. See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 749-750; Glensy, supra note 352; Maxine D.
Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740,
751 (2006).
297. Yoshino, supra note 22, at 749-50.
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Court’s negative rights biased, libertarian perspective as elucidated in The Fifth Freedom.298
However, Lawrence’s application of dignity, with its attendant positive rights implications
regarding ensuring opportunity to achieve basic and essential human achievements,299
demonstrates the falsehood of the negative and positive rights dichotomy.300 Applying the
concept of human dignity to interpret a due process clause based right, helps expose the true
connection between duty and freedom as well as the connection between democracy and liberty.
CONCLUSION
Education is essential to human dignity because education is essential to the two
fundamental components to human dignity: liberty and democracy. Despite the importance of
education to liberty and democracy, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to recognize education

298. Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 81.
299. SEN, supra note 15, at 4-5, 10-11, 36-49, 144 (arguing for basic capabilities that
enhance freedom, including the capability to be educated, and arguing that education is
important to economic and political participation).
300. See Nunn, supra note 232, at 78-79 (“The theoretical limitations of colorblindness
arise from its obsession with procedure and its willful ignorance of results. Colorblind analysts
tinker with the rules but need not attend to the outcome of the game. Richard Delgado calls this
preference for equality of opportunity over equality of result a false dichotomy.” (footnote
omitted)); Roberts, supra note 232, at 389 (“The process of counterbalancing white individuals’
private interests against government programs that promote racial equality sets up a false
dichotomy between private choices on the one hand and government action on the other.”).

as a fundamental right or even to consistently protect against blatant inequalities in access to and
quality of public education. However, the Court’s human dignity jurisprudence opens a
possibility for recognizing a right to public education by way of a dignity-based due process
clause analysis.
Lawrence v. Texas has expanded the scope for protecting the right to privacy through a
human dignity-based argument that privacy is essential to liberty and liberty is essential to
dignity. The case for a human dignity-based recognition of the right to public education is even
stronger for education than for the right to privacy. This is because, unlike the right to privacy,
education is essential to both the liberty and the democracy components of human dignity.
The Court’s continuing failure to recognize and protect the right to education undermines
liberty and jeopardizes the very foundation of American democracy. Without equal and fair
access to education, liberty becomes meaningless and democracy an empty concept capable of
immediate devolution into aristocracy or plutocracy.
Applying this analysis in the context of public education would be a significant step
towards unhinging our constitutional doctrine from the false rights dichotomy inherent in the
current Court’s libertarian and anti-equality bias. Today, education is once again specially
situated as the bridge for overcoming separate but equal styled inequality, just as it did before in
Brown v. Board of Education.
The positive right of access to public education will require a new form of constitutional
analysis under the due process clause if it is to be recognized and meaningfully enforced. This
new due process would be based in a human dignity jurisprudence301 that applies the insights

301. Glensy, supra note 352 (discussing the concept of human dignity and relevant
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from the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.302 The
mechanics of this new due process will need to be further developed, but it promises to have
ramifications well beyond the education rights context. Applying this new due process could
finally lead to meaningful recognition and enforcement of government’s other fundamental
duties or positive rights.
Government has a duty to act, if for no other purpose than to preserve human dignity.
Education is essential to human dignity and a duty for government to provide equal access to a
high quality, public education can and should be enforced by way of a dignity-based due process
clause analysis.

approaches to reaching it, including negative and positive rights theories).
302. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 17-18. According to Nussbaum:
“Capability Approach” and “Capabilities Approach” are the key terms in
the political/economic program Sen proposes in works such as Inequality
Reexamined and Development as Freedom, where the project is to commend the
capability framework as the best space within which to make comparisons of life
quality, and to show why it is superior to utilitarian and quasi-Rawlsian
approaches.

